

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 06467 101204Z

41

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CU-02 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 BIB-01 NEA-09 AF-06 /100 W

----- 090250

R 101042Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 55

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T MOSCOW 6467

NOFORN

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR CSCE UR

SUBJ: CSCE: FOLLOW-UP

REF: GENEVA 3278

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 06467 101204Z

1. SUMMARY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ADVANTAGES FOR THE U.S. AND ALLIES OF A CSCE FOLLOW-UP WHICH GAVE THE WEST SOME MONITORING CAPABILITY OVER SOVIET OBLIGATIONS--IF IT CAN BE ACHIEVED--PROBABLY OUTWEIGH THE COSTS TO WESTERN INTERESTS. THIS INDEED IS PRECISELY THE REASON WHY THE SOVIETS, WHILE STILL INTERESTED IN CERTAIN ASPECTS OF A FOLLOW-UP, MAY BE REASSESSING THEIR ORIGINAL DEVOTION TO THE CZECH PROPOSAL. THEREFORE, IF A WESTERN CONSENSUS EMERGES AGAINST A FOLLOW-UP, THERE MAY BE NO NEED TO OFFER THE SOVIETS CONCESSION FOR GIVING UP WHAT THEY PROBABLY WANT TO AVOID ANYWAY. END SUMMARY.

2. WE ARE NOT COMPETENT TO COMMENT ON THE TACTICS THE U.S. SHOULD PURSUE AS THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MOVES TO CENTER-STAGE, BUT WE HAVE A FEW GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SOVIET ANGLE OF USDEL CSCE'S THOUGHT-PROVOKING REFTEL.

3. AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, WE BELIVE THAT THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON BASKET THREE AND ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES HAS COOLED THE SOVIET ARDOR FOR ENACTMENT OF THE CZECH RESOLUTION FOR A PERMANENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE. WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY AFRAID OF IS A FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM THAT CAN BE USED TO MONITOR FULFILLMENT OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS IN THESE TWO AREAS. THUS, WE THINK THAT SOVIET "FLIEXIBILITY" ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE IS MOTIVATED, NOT BY TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, BUT BY REAL SOVIET INTERESTS. WE DO NOT BELIVE, THEREFORE, THAT THE WEST SHOULD NEED, OR FEEL OBLIGED, TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO DILUTE SOVIET DEVOTION TO A FOLLOW-UP.

4. LOOKING NOW AT WESTERN INTERESTS, WE CAN SEE AN ADVANTAGE IN A FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM WHICH PROVIDED A FORUM FOR HOLDING SOVIET FEET TO THE FIRE ON THEIR OBLIGATIONS. SUCH A MONITORING DEVICE COULD MAKE IT SOMEWHAT HARDER FOR THE SOVIETS TO WRIGGLE OFF THE HOOK ON BASKET THREE, AND WOULD AT A MINIMUM EXPOSE THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE FORMERLY AND PUBLICLY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 06467 101204Z

5. WE RECOGNIZE HOW DIFFICULT IT MIGHT BE TO ACHIEVE SUCH A FOCUSSED FOLLOW-UP RESULT. WE ALSO ACCEPT THE NEED TO PREVENT A FOLW-UP FROM SERVING SUCH SOVIET OBJECTIVES AS (1) PROVIDING A SOUNDING BOARD FOR SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FUTURE CONFERENCES, (2) STRENGTHENING THE SOVIET RIGHT TO SPEAK ON WESTERN EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES, AND (3) INCREASING MOSCOW'S

ABILITY TO MONITOR EASTERN EUROPEAN CONTACTS WITH THE WEST. HOWEVER, IF THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF A FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM CAN BE KEPT FAIRLY MODEST, WE WOULD NOT BE TOO WORRIED ABOUT ITS CONTRIBUTING SUBSTANTIALLY TO ANY OF THESE SOVIET DESIDERATA. ON THE FIRST, THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE PROPAGANDA IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FOLLOW-UP; THE SECOND IS A TWO-EDGED SWORD WHICH THE WEST MIGHT BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT TO INCREASE ITS VOICE IN EASTERN EUROPE; AND ON THE THIRD, THE SOVIETS HAVE OTHER AND BETTER WAYS OF MONITORING THEIR ALLIES' DEALINGS WITH THE WEST.

6. IN SUM, WHILE MOSCOW MAY WELL BE ABLE TO FISH IN TROUBLED WESTERN WATERS AS FOLLOW-UP NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED, IT BEARS NOTING THAT SOVIET WATERS ARE NOT SO SMOOTH EITHER. IF A PRIME WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN CSCE IS TO MAKE IT HARDER FOR MOSCOW TO RESIST THE MODERATING AND CIVILIZING INFLUENCES WHICH CONTACTS WITH THE WEST CAN ULTIMATELY HAVE ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES, THEN THE RIGHT KIND OF CSCE FOLLOW-UP COULD PLAY A MODEST BUT POSITIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING THOSE INFLUENCES.
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, BASKET III, NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ellisoob
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW06467
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750164-0983
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750563/aaaaceuz.tel
Line Count: 138
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 GENEVA 3278
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ellisoob
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 MAY 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <24 SEP 2003 by ellisoob>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: FOLLOW-UP
TAGS: PFOR, UR, CSCE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006